

12 Aug 87

Surprises, w/out early part of war:

Contingency & critics of our race:

- such limited prolif, so far.
- no accidental explosion, so far.
- no combat use, since Nagasaki.
- "Even though we know how we should be studied FU in early combat (US twice, SU now).
- threats have retained some potency, and have shape been used, despite parity.
- D-C plans, and early props, persist despite ultra-high-level parity.
(and, production/deployment of nucs).
- no FS - ^{on} promptness, fatal alarm or attrition, as far.
- Plans, and real prospects, of limited are war ^(contracts turning of use forms) persist, despite parity): nuclear instability is not assumed

But see:

- crisis before WWI;

- "no previous

failure is

challenge program"

(though my

non-missile

and much more,

all recent)

Consider effects of encouraging the
public — and ^{all RAND} staffs — to fear
the "real possibility of a aggressive
imperial nuclear attack" — as
defining the character of the SU,
an "adversary". (Kennan's point, in 1949
or recently)

(with ^{SU} experts, and top officials,
know recently this fear was not
warranted).

and the impression of SU, quite misleading.

Kennan forwarded ⁰⁾ CR — but ¹⁾ not with
us — and ²⁾ not roll-back; ³⁾ he did
not fear SU roll-back; but (4) opposed
we build-up. [and H-bomb?]]

He did not make 1, 2, 3, 4 clear
in Mr. X article! nor (5) explicit in
other times!

(He did justify CR — "classic" CW
times! like NSC-68 (which disregarded on
1-4:]